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ABORTION, STERILIZATION, AND THE UNIVERSE OF
REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS

MELISSA MURRAY*
ABSTRACT
In recent years, a new narrative associating reproductive rights
with the eugenics movement of the 1920s has taken root. As this
narrative maintains, in the 1920s, Margaret Sanger, a pioneer of the
modern birth control movement, joined forces with the eugenics
movement to market family planning measures to marginalized
minority communities.
Although the history undergirding this narrative is incomplete
and misleading, the narrative itself has flourished as the debate over
the continued vitality of reproductive rights has unfolded in the
United States. Indeed, in just the last three years, a member of the
United States Supreme Court and a number of lower federal court
judges have referenced the alleged links between abortion, contraception, and eugenics in their defense of abortion restrictions.
The effort to link abortion and contraception to the racialized logic
of the eugenics movement is interesting on a number of fronts. As I
have written elsewhere, this narrative is at once a potent defense of
abortion restrictions and a more calculated effort to recast the social
meaning of reproductive rights from a question of gender equality to
one of racial inequality. But equally noteworthy is the narrative’s
utter neglect of the eugenics movement’s investment in coercive
sterilization—not abortion or contraception—as its preferred vehicle
of reproductive control and social engineering.
* Frederick I. and Grace Stokes Professor of Law, NYU School of Law. In April 2021, I
delivered the annual George Wythe Lecture at William & Mary Law School. This Article
builds on those remarks. I received helpful feedback from Leah Litman, Doug NeJaime, and
participants at the Family Law Teachers and Scholars Conference. Chad Hughes and Nina
Haug provided terrific research assistance. All errors are my own.
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With all of this in mind, this Article seeks to reframe the interest
in reproductive rights, racism, and eugenics to include a more robust
discussion of sterilization practices. To do so, the Article supplements
the historical narrative to clarify that the eugenics movement’s
interest in racial betterment was primarily directed at improving
and purifying the white race. To the extent the eugenics movement
focused on abortion and contraception, it was in limiting middleand upper-class white women’s access to these vehicles of reproductive freedom on the ground that the reproduction of these constituencies was vital to the future of the white race. Insofar as eugenicists
were interested in limiting reproduction, their interest was directed
toward those individuals who possessed traits deemed unsuitable for
the propagation of the white race—and meaningfully, their preferred
vehicle for limiting reproduction among the “unfit” was not contraception or abortion, but rather, sterilization.
And even as popular interest in eugenics waned in the 1940s, the
state’s interest in sterilization as a means of reproductive control did
not abate. Indeed, as the Civil Rights Movement and the welfare
rights movement dawned, many states repurposed sterilization to
limit the reproductive capacities of those deemed sexually immoral
or unduly dependent on the public fisc, usually poor women of color.
To underscore the relationship between race, class, dependence,
and state-endorsed sterilization, the Article highlights Cox v.
Stanton, a challenge to North Carolina’s sterilization program litigated by Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Brenda Feigen Fasteau, and the
ACLU’s Women’s Rights Project in the 1970s. Although Cox did not
result in the invalidation of state sterilization programs, it—and
other contemporary challenges to sterilization abuse—made clear the
centrality of sterilization as a technology of reproductive control, as
well as sterilization abuse’s racialized impact. In this regard, the
nascent effort to associate abortion and contraception with eugenic
racism not only equates state-sponsored reproductive abuses with an
individual’s decision to terminate or avoid pregnancy, but also
overlooks—and indeed, further obscures—the significant history of
racialized sterilization abuse in the United States.
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INTRODUCTION
On April 13, 2021, an en banc panel of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit issued a ruling allowing an Ohio
abortion restriction to take effect.1 The challenged restriction bars
doctors from performing abortions on women who choose to end
their pregnancies because the fetus has Down syndrome.2 Similar
trait-selection laws, colloquially known as “reason bans,” have been
enacted around the country, including at the federal level3—and
have been successfully challenged and invalidated under the
Supreme Court’s long-standing abortion precedents, Roe v. Wade
and Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey.4
But the Sixth Circuit’s 9-7 ruling departed from the logic of these
other cases, concluding that “there is no absolute or per se right to
an abortion based on the stage of the pregnancy.”5 The conflict
between the Sixth Circuit’s ruling and the other federal courts of
appeals presents a circuit split that could bring the constitutional
status of reason bans—and the abortion right more generally—to
the Supreme Court’s doorstep once again.6
1. Preterm-Cleveland v. McCloud, 994 F.3d 512 (6th Cir. 2021).
2. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.10(B) (LexisNexis 2018).
3. See, e.g., Prenatal Nondiscrimination Act (PRENDA) of 2016, H.R. 4924, 114th Cong.
(2d Sess. 2016); Jill C. Morrison, Resuscitating the Black Body: Reproductive Justice as
Resistance to the State’s Property Interest in Black Women’s Reproductive Capacity, 31 YALE
J.L. & FEMINISM 35, 46 n.69 (2019) (describing legislative efforts to ban abortion based on
race); Abortion Bans in Cases of Sex or Race Selection or Genetic Anomaly, GUTTMACHER INST.
(Sept. 1, 2021), https://www.guttmacher.org/state-policy/explore/abortion-bans-cases-sex-orraceselection-or-genetic-anomaly [https://perma.cc/3P6X-CGC9] (outlining state and federal
trait-selection abortion legislation in various cases).
4. See Planned Parenthood of Ind. & Ky., Inc. v. Comm’r of the Ind. State Dep’t of Health,
888 F.3d 300, 302 (7th Cir. 2018), rev’d in part on other grounds sub nom. Box v. Planned
Parenthood of Ind. & Ky., Inc., 139 S. Ct. 1780 (2019) (per curiam) (invalidating challenged
reason ban on grounds that it “clearly violate[d]” Casey, a “well-established Supreme Court
precedent”); Little Rock Fam. Plan. Servs. v. Rutledge, 984 F.3d 682, 690 (8th Cir. 2021) (“[I]t
is undisputed that [the challenged reason ban] is a substantial obstacle; indeed, it is a
complete prohibition of abortions based on the pregnant woman’s reason for exercising the
right to terminate her pregnancy before viability.”).
5. Preterm-Cleveland, 994 F.3d at 521.
6. Melissa Murray, A New, Racialized Assault on Abortion Rights Is Headed to the
Supreme Court, WASH. POST (Apr. 18, 2021, 8:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
opinions/2021/04/18/new-racialized-assault-abortion-rights-is-headed-supreme-court/
[https://perma.cc/3YHA-Z5KD]. In October Term 2021, the Court will decide Dobbs v. Jackson
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Although it would not be the first time the high court has confronted the charged question of abortion,7 in this iteration, the
terms of the debate would be starkly different from earlier abortion
challenges. Whereas the conflict over abortion rights has long been
framed in terms of women’s autonomy and equality, the Sixth
Women’s Health Organization, a challenge to Mississippi’s HB 1510, which prohibits abortion
at 15 weeks of pregnancy. Jackson Women’s Health Org. v. Dobbs, 945 F.3d 265 (5th Cir.
2019), cert. granted in part 141 S. Ct. 2619 (May 17, 2021). That challenge also raises
questions about the continued vitality of the Court’s abortion jurisprudence. See Brief for
Petitioners at 14, Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Org., 2021 WL 3145936 (No. 18-60868)
(July 22, 2021) (“This Court should overrule Roe and Casey.”).
7. In the half-century since Roe v. Wade recognized a constitutional right to choose an
abortion, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973), the Supreme Court has faced a series of abortion-related
legal challenges. E.g., Nat’l Inst. of Fam. & Life Advocs. v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2370
(2018) (invalidating a California law requiring certain disclosures regarding abortion at crisis
pregnancy centers); Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2300 (2016)
(invalidating two Texas abortion restrictions); McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2526,
2541 (2014) (invalidating a Massachusetts law prescribing “buffer zones” at abortion clinic
entrances); Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 132-33 (upholding a federal law proscribing
a particular abortion procedure); Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng., 546 U.S. 320,
323-24 (2006) (considering a facial challenge to New Hampshire’s parental notification
requirement); Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 921-22 (2000) (invalidating a Nebraska law
proscribing a particular abortion procedure); Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 735 (2000) (upholding a Colorado law prohibiting sidewalk counseling within one hundred feet of any
healthcare facility, including abortion clinics); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833, 844-46 (1992) (reaffirming Roe’s essential holding and upholding several provisions
of the Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 177-78 (1991)
(upholding federal regulations prohibiting family planning clinics receiving Title X funding
from providing counseling regarding abortion or referring clients for abortions); Webster v.
Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 499-501 (1989) (upholding a Missouri law denying state
funding for and prohibiting state employee participation in performing or providing
counseling regarding abortions); Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists,
476 U.S. 747, 772 (1986) (invalidating a Pennsylvania law requiring informed consent on fetal
development, abortion alternatives, and the medical risks of abortion; reporting of abortions;
and that the physician use the abortion method most likely to preserve the life of a viable
child); City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 452 (1983) (invalidating a range of abortion restrictions); H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 413 (1981)
(upholding a Utah parental notification requirement); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 326
(1980) (upholding the Hyde Amendment, which strictly limits the use of federal funds for
abortions); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 651 (1979) (plurality opinion) (invalidating a
Massachusetts parental consent requirement); Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 401 (1979)
(invalidating a Pennsylvania law requiring doctors to protect the life of a fetus that “may be
viable” both during and after an abortion); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474 (1977) (holding
that a state has “authority ... to make a value judgment favoring childbirth over abortion, and
to implement that judgment by the allocation of public funds”); Planned Parenthood of Cent.
Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 84 (1976) (invalidating a range of abortion restrictions); see also
Melissa Murray, The Symbiosis of Abortion and Precedent, 134 HARV. L. REV. 308, 313-14
(2020) (discussing the history of abortion challenges at the high court).
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Circuit’s decision upholding the challenged reason ban frames
abortion in terms of eugenics and discrimination. In its decision
allowing the Ohio reason ban to take effect, a majority of the full
Sixth Circuit credited the State’s interest in “protect[ing] the Down
syndrome community—both born and unborn—from ... discriminatory abortions.”8 A flurry of concurring opinions went even further,
characterizing the challenged abortion law as “an anti-eugenics
statute”9 aimed at preventing “physicians from knowingly engaging
in the practice of eugenics,”10 and noting the associations between
eugenics and the Holocaust.11
To be sure, in characterizing reason bans as “antidiscrimination”12 measures, the judges of the Sixth Circuit were not writing
on a blank slate.13 Both the majority and the concurrences cited
Justice Thomas’s concurring opinion in Box v. Planned Parenthood
of Indiana and Kentucky.14 In Box, the high court, in a per curiam
opinion, declined to take up a challenge to a similar Indiana reason
ban.15 Although Justice Thomas agreed that the Court’s decision to
defer review of the challenged law would allow “further percolation”
of the issue, he nonetheless observed that the time was coming
when the Court would be forced “to confront the constitutionality of
laws like Indiana’s.”16 And then, in a surprising turn, Justice
Thomas continued, crafting a concurring opinion in which he
associated abortion with eugenics and credited reason bans with
“promot[ing] a State’s compelling interest in preventing abortion
from becoming a tool of modern-day eugenics.”17

8. Preterm-Cleveland, 994 F.3d at 517.
9. Id. at 536 (Sutton, J., concurring).
10. Id. at 538 (Griffin, J., concurring).
11. Id. (“Many think that eugenics ended with the horrors of the Holocaust. Unfortunately, it did not. The philosophy and the pure evil that motivated Hitler and Nazi
Germany to murder millions of innocent lives continues today. Eugenics was the root of the
Holocaust and is a motivation for many of the selective abortions that occur today.”).
12. See id. at 541 (Bush, J., concurring) (noting that the challenged reason ban was aimed
at “preventing discrimination”).
13. Id. at 538 (Griffin, J., concurring) (quoting Box v. Planned Parenthood of Ind. & Ky.,
Inc., 139 S. Ct. 1780, 1783 (2019) (Thomas, J., concurring)).
14. Id. at 517 (majority opinion); id. at 538 (Griffin, J., concurring).
15. Box, 139 S. Ct. at 1781 (denying certiorari in part).
16. Id. at 1784 (Thomas, J., concurring).
17. Id. at 1783.
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To underscore abortion’s “eugenic” possibilities, Justice Thomas
looked to history—and specifically, the association between Margaret Sanger, the founder of the modern birth control movement,
and the eugenics movement.18 As he explained, in the 1920s and
1930s, Sanger and the birth control movement she spearheaded
joined forces with the eugenics movement to champion contraception as a means of limiting reproduction among “the unfit.”19 More
importantly, because “the distinction between the fit and the unfit
could be drawn along racial lines,”20 Justice Thomas intimated that
Sanger and the eugenicists were operating strategically, targeting
the Black community for family planning measures, siting birth
control clinics in Black neighborhoods, and enlisting Black clergy in
their efforts to market birth control to Black women.21
Some scholars have objected to the characterization of Sanger and
her work as racist, noting that Sanger’s interest in “voluntary
motherhood” and contraceptive access for all women was at odds
with the eugenicists’ interest in encouraging reproduction among
the most “fit”—generally assumed to be middle- and upper-class
whites.22 Still, as Justice Thomas notes, the eugenics movement
was undergirded by a racialized logic, and that logic had legs, informing federal immigration policy and state-level laws, including
laws prohibiting miscegenation and interracial marriage.23 Indeed,
in Buck v. Bell, the Supreme Court “threw its prestige behind the
eugenics movement ... upholding the constitutionality of Virginia’s

18. Id. at 1787-90.
19. Id. at 1787.
20. Id. at 1785.
21. See id. at 1788.
22. Charles Valenza, Was Margaret Sanger a Racist?, 17 FAM. PLAN. PERSPS. 44, 44-45
(1985). To the extent that Sanger’s involvement in “The Negro Project” reflected an interest
in targeting birth control to the Black community, some scholars have noted that Sanger’s
pronouncements on the subject merely echo the advocacy of prominent Black intellectuals,
like W.E.B. DeBois, who championed family planning measures as a means of stabilizing and
uplifting the economic fortunes of the Black community. Id. at 45-46.
23. Box, 139 S. Ct. at 1785-86 (“Eugenic arguments like these helped precipitate the
Immigration Act of 1924, which significantly reduced immigration from outside of Western
and Northern Europe. The perceived superiority of the white race also led to calls for race
consciousness in marital and reproductive decisions, including through antimiscegenation
laws.” (citations omitted)).
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forced-sterilization law” and “g[iving] the eugenics movement added
legitimacy and considerable momentum.”24
It is not altogether surprising that in considering the contemporary prospect of eugenics, Justice Thomas would invoke the specter
of Buck v. Bell. The 1927 decision, and its callous observation that
“[t]hree generations of imbeciles are enough,”25 stands as an unfortunate monument to the pervasive pull of eugenics in early twentieth century policy making.
What is perhaps more surprising is that, even as he cited Buck v.
Bell, Justice Thomas’s concern about the contemporary manifestation of eugenics—and its racial dynamics—remained stubbornly
focused on abortion and contraception, the twin pillars of reproductive rights.26 In his telling, abortion and contraception have the
eugenic potential to deracinate minority communities—a potential
genocide facilitated by the state’s misguided recognition of constitutional rights to choose an abortion and to use contraception.27
Critically, state-endorsed sterilization programs, of the sort
upheld in Buck v. Bell, are mentioned only in passing in Justice
Thomas’s narrative—a vestige of an unfortunate past when the
Court and the country were in the thrall of eugenicists.28 The reader
is left to assume that state-sponsored sterilization programs, like
public support for eugenics, “waned considerably by the 1940s as
Americans became familiar with the eugenics of the Nazis and
scientific literature undermined the assumptions on which the
eugenics movement was built.”29
But is this narrative correct? As this Article argues, Justice
Thomas’s effort to graft the history of the eugenics movement to the
history of abortion and the history of racial injustice is problematic
along multiple dimensions. As an initial matter, Justice Thomas’s
account is only a partial rendering of the history of eugenics in the
United States. It overlooks the fact that neither the eugenics movement nor Margaret Sanger was preoccupied with endorsing abortion
as a means of reproductive control. Nor was the eugenics movement
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Id. at 1786 (citing Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927)).
Buck, 274 U.S. at 207.
Box, 139 S. Ct. at 1782-93 (Thomas, J., concurring).
Id.
Id. at 1786 (briefly discussing sterilization in the context of Buck v. Bell).
Id.
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unduly focused on the reproductive capacities of racial minorities.
Instead, the eugenics movement was focused on improving and
purifying the white race. Indeed, the eugenics movement’s interest
in abortion and contraception was principally focused on limiting
middle and upper class white women’s access to these vehicles of
reproductive freedom on the ground that the reproduction of these
constituencies was necessary for the future of the white race. To the
extent that eugenicists were interested in limiting reproduction,
their interest was directed toward those individuals who possessed
traits deemed unsuitable for the propagation of the white race. And
meaningfully, the principal vehicle of their efforts to regulate reproduction among the “unfit” was not contraception or abortion, but
rather, sterilization.
This is all to say that in attempting to root abortion and contraception in a history of racial injustice, Justice Thomas neglects the
eugenics movement’s preoccupation with purifying the white race
and its profound appetite for sterilization as the preferred vehicle
of reproductive control. Moreover, his conclusion that abortion and
contraception are rife with the “eugenic potential”30 to deracinate
marginalized minority groups neglects a more recent history—one
that emerged in the wake of the Civil Rights Movement and the
expansion of the welfare state—in which sterilization was deployed
explicitly for the purpose of limiting the reproductive capacities of
those deemed sexually immoral or unduly dependent on the state,
usually poor women of color. In this regard, Justice Thomas’s narrative not only equates state-sponsored reproductive abuses with an
individual’s decision to terminate or avoid pregnancy, but also overlooks—and indeed, further obscures—the significant history of
racialized sterilization abuse in the United States.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I supplements the history
undergirding Justice Thomas’s Box concurrence. Building on Justice
Thomas’s invocation of Buck v. Bell, the 1927 case in which the
United States Supreme Court upheld Virginia’s eugenics-informed
sterilization statute, this Part sheds light on the principal aims of
the eugenics movement: improving and purifying the white race. As
this Part explains, state-sponsored sterilization programs were

30. Id. at 1783.
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rooted in the eugenics movement’s interest in limiting reproduction
to the “fittest” in society. Critically, during this period, the targets
of eugenics-inflected reproductive policies were not non-whites, but
more often poor whites, like Carrie Buck, the petitioner in Buck v.
Bell, who were viewed as degrading and debasing the white race
with their undesirable genes.
As Part II observes, the eugenics movement’s allure waned in the
1940s and 1950s, as its scientific credentials were challenged and it
became increasingly associated with the genocidal acts of the Third
Reich. Still, as that Part explains, despite waning interest in eugenics, the state interest in sterilization did not abate. Instead, the
impulse toward sterilization proceeded under a new rationale—the
desire to prevent the morally lax and sexually incontinent from
accessing public assistance benefits and overwhelming the state’s
limited resources. And critically, those targeted for sterilization
were no longer the genetically unfit, but rather those whose sexual
immorality and dependence on the state threatened to overwhelm
the public fisc. In this regard, at the same time the Civil Rights
Movement was dismantling de jure segregation and Jim Crow, and
the welfare state was expanding to include minorities, southern
states were quietly repurposing their state sterilization programs
to limit reproduction among those who were unduly dependent—or
were assumed to become dependent—on the public fisc. Unsurprisingly, these efforts assumed a decidedly racialized cast as Black
women and women of color were disproportionately represented
among those targeted for sterilization.
To illustrate the impact of state sterilization abuse during this
period and to provide a counterpoint to Buck v. Bell and the eugenicist focus on racial purity, Part III considers Cox v. Stanton, a
1970s sterilization challenge brought by Ruth Bader Ginsburg and
the ACLU’s Women’s Rights Project. Specifically, that Part recounts
the tragic story of Nial Cox, who was involuntarily sterilized by the
state of North Carolina when she was a teenager. In challenging
North Carolina’s sterilization program, Ginsburg and the ACLU
acknowledged the program’s origins in the eugenics movement, but
critically, underscored the degree to which this iteration of statesponsored sterilization had evolved to target minority women
because of race, class, and welfare dependence. As Part III argues,
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the tragedy of Nial Cox was no anomaly. During the 1960s and
1970s, there were numerous episodes of state-sponsored sterilization abuse.
With Part IV, the Article comes full circle, returning to Justice
Thomas’s concurrence in Box v. Planned Parenthood of Indiana and
Kentucky. As that Part explains, Thomas’s association of abortion
with eugenics seeks to locate abortion within the landscape of racial
injustices that targets communities of color, and the Black community, in particular. But to the extent this narrative undergirds
the view that reproductive rights are rooted in racial injustice, the
argument falls wide of the mark. As an initial matter, this narrative
overlooks a broad history in which the eugenic interest in reproduction was largely directed at promoting white purity and white
supremacy. And, in associating contemporary state support for
reproductive rights with the racialized harms of eugenics, this
narrative conveniently overlooks the more recent history of targeted
sterilization abuse of minority communities.
As Part IV maintains, these oversights have significant consequences. Not only does this neglected history suggest a more
complicated relationship between reproductive rights and racial
injustice than Justice Thomas’s narrative allows, but it also makes
clear that the conventional understanding of “reproductive rights”
is unduly limited to the narrow constitutional protections that exist
for abortion and contraception. The broader history of statesponsored sterilization abuse—from the eugenics movement to the
present day—makes clear that access to abortion and contraception
does not exhaust the full range of reproductive rights concerns. We
should understand sterilization abuse—and indeed, any method of
reproductive control that seeks to strip individuals of the choice to
procreate—as an imposition on reproductive freedom.
Critically, centering sterilization abuse alongside abortion and
contraception as part of the landscape of reproductive rights
concerns highlights the strong correlation between race and
socioeconomic status and vulnerability to reproductive control. In
this regard, reorienting the landscape of reproductive rights to
include sterilization abuse emphasizes the degree to which the
extant discourse of reproductive rights may focus unduly on the
rights of those who enjoy race and class privilege while overlooking
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persistent impositions on the reproductive rights of marginalized
communities. A brief conclusion follows.
I. RACE, STERILIZATION, AND THE EUGENICS MOVEMENT
The origins of the eugenics movement have been traced to Sir
Francis Galton, an English scientist whose interest in the science
of heredity was piqued by Charles Darwin’s theory of natural selection, which posited that over time, the weakest species become
extinct.31 Convinced that “[w]hat Nature does blindly, slowly, and
ruthlessly, man may do providently, quickly, and kindly,” Galton
sought to replace the natural evolution of the species with “affirmative state intervention” aimed at promoting the very best of
humankind.32 “Eugenics”—taken from the Greek root meaning “good
in birth”—was “‘the science of improving stock’ by allowing ‘the
more suitable races or strains of blood a better chance of prevailing
speedily over the less suitable than they otherwise would have
had.’”33 Because character and intelligence were presumed to be
heritable qualities, eugenicists argued that society should encourage
the procreation of those of superior lineage, while discouraging
procreation among—and public support for—those of inferior
lineage.34
Unsurprisingly, Galton’s eugenic theories were underwritten by
a deep-seated belief in “genetic distinctions between [the] races.”35
Eugenic theory posited that the human species was divided into
different races, each with its own distinctive features and characteristics.36 According to Galton: “The Mongolians, Jews, Negroes,
Gipsies, and American Indians severally propagate their kinds; and
each kind differs in character and intellect, as well as in colour and

31. DOROTHY ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK BODY: RACE, REPRODUCTION, AND THE MEAN59 (1997).
32. Id.
33. Id. (quoting FRANCIS GALTON, INQUIRIES INTO HUMAN FACULTY AND ITS DEVELOPMENT 24-25 (1883)).
34. Id. at 59-60.
35. Id. at 60.
36. Id.; see also Sonia M. Suter, A Brave New World of Designer Babies?, 22 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 897, 904 (2007) (noting that eugenicists of the 1920s “conflated national and racial
identity and believed that race determined behavior”).
ING OF LIBERTY
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shape, from the other four.”37 Notably, Blacks were distinctive from
other racial groups in their “strong impulsive passions,” their
“remarkabl[e] domestic[ity],” and were “endowed with such constitutional vigour, and [were] so prolific, that [their] race [was]
irrepressible.”38 At a time when white Americans openly worried
that their ranks would be overwhelmed by the fecundity of immigrants and newly freed Blacks,39 it is unsurprising that “eugenic
theories ... took root and flourished in the United States.”40
By the early twentieth century, the American legal landscape was
dotted with laws that reflected both anxiety about demographic
change and an interest in regulating white reproduction in the
name of eugenics. For example, the concern that the birth rate
among immigrants and non-whites was outpacing the birth rate
among native-born white women animated the campaigns to criminalize abortion and contraceptive use in the postbellum era.41 On
this account, eugenics ideology valorized white, middle-class
reproduction as necessary to advance American nation building,
while simultaneously “derid[ing] working class, immigrant, and
other women as both hyper-fecund and unfit” for both motherhood
and nation building.42
But “positive” eugenics’s interest in controlling (and encouraging)
white women’s reproduction was only part of the equation. The
eugenics movement was also deeply focused on ensuring that only
the fittest of the white race reproduced.43 To this end, the eugenics
movement spearheaded the expansion of laws criminalizing
miscegenation and interracial marriage in an effort to prevent the
37. ROBERTS, supra note 31, at 60.
38. Id.
39. See Nicola Beisel & Tamara Kay, Abortion, Race, and Gender in Nineteenth-Century
America, 69 AM. SOCIO. REV. 498, 509 (2004); MADISON GRANT, THE PASSING OF THE GREAT
RACE OR THE RACIAL BASIS OF EUROPEAN HISTORY 66 (1916) (lamenting the demographic
catastrophe of World War I and the possibility of racial degradation).
40. Melissa Murray, Race-ing Roe: Reproductive Justice, Racial Justice, and the Battle for
Roe v. Wade, 134 HARV. L. REV. 2025, 2037 (2021).
41. See Reva Siegel, Reasoning from the Body: A Historical Perspective on Abortion
Regulation and Questions of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L. REV. 261, 285 n.87, 297-300 (1992).
42. Lisa C. Ikemoto, Infertile by Force and Federal Complicity: The Story of Relf v.
Weinberger, in WOMEN AND THE LAW STORIES 179, 185 (Elizabeth M. Schneider & Stephanie
M. Wildman eds., 2011).
43. Khiara M. Bridges, White Privilege and White Disadvantage, 105 VA. L. REV. 449, 46567 (2019).
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“mongrelization” of the white race.44 Federal level immigration
policy also became a proving ground for eugenicist logic. In the
name of improving the country’s gene pool, the eugenics movement
championed immigration laws and policies that encouraged
immigration from Northern Europe, while discouraging immigration
from Southern Europe, Asia, and Africa.45
But closer to home, the eugenics movement also sought to safeguard the country’s genetic destiny by preventing those with
undesirable genetic traits from reproducing.46 In the early twentieth
century, a number of states enacted eugenics-informed laws
permitting the sterilization of the “feebleminded”47 and “habitual
criminals.”48 The eugenicist interest in sterilization spoke to both
the concern with limiting reproduction among those deemed “undesirable” and the broader interest in cultivating “the fittest” of the
race.49 Sterilization of the “unfit” prevented the proliferation of
undesirable traits, like mental illness, disability, and criminality,
that were presumed to be heritable.50 Moreover, sterilization assisted with population control, curbing excess reproduction and
fostering an environment that was believed to be more conducive to
sustainable human development and growth.51
And critically, sterilization was a crucial means of maintaining
the purity of the white race. Buck v. Bell is instructive on this point.
For most scholars of constitutional law, Buck has long been associated with the triumph of eugenics at the United States Supreme
Court. But, perhaps less obviously, the decision also speaks to the
44. ROBERTS, supra note 31, at 268; see also Matthew J. Lindsay, Reproducing a Fit
Citizenry: Dependency, Eugenics, and the Law of Marriage in the United States, 1860-1920,
23 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 541, 546 & n.7 (1998).
45. See Suter, supra note 36, at 907 (noting that eugenic principles were “central to the
passage of the Immigration Restriction Act of 1924, which set quotas limiting the immigration
of ‘biologically inferior’ ethnic groups into the United States and favored the entrance of
Northern Europeans”); Robert J. Cynkar, Buck v. Bell: “Felt Necessities” v. Fundamental
Values?, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1418, 1432 (1981).
46. Khiara M. Bridges, Race, Pregnancy, and the Opioid Epidemic: White Privilege and
the Criminalization of Opioid Use During Pregnancy, 133 HARV. L. REV. 770, 830-31 (2020)
(discussing the eugenics movement’s interest in racial purity and improvement).
47. ROBERTS, supra note 31, at 69; Suter, supra note 36, at 906.
48. ROBERTS, supra note 31, at 268; Lindsay, supra note 44, at 570.
49. Murray, supra note 40, at 2038.
50. Id. at 2056-60.
51. Id. at 2046.
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underlying racial politics of the eugenics movement. The Section
that follows explores this aspect of Buck v. Bell and its relationship
to the eugenics movement.
A. Buck v. Bell and the Racial Politics of the Eugenics Movement
Decided in 1927—the same year that Virginia enacted the
eugenics-inflected Racial Integrity Act, which would proscribe miscegenation and interracial marriage52—Buck was a challenge to a
Virginia state statute that authorized the compulsory sterilization
of the intellectually disabled in the name of eugenics.53
The question before the Court was whether Virginia’s eugenicsinformed sterilization statute, which authorized the sterilization of
eighteen-year-old Carrie Buck on the ground that she was “feeble
minded,” violated the Constitution.54 Virginia argued that the
statute was a permissible use of the state’s police power to legislate
for the general welfare of its citizens.55 Writing for the majority,
Justice Holmes echoed the logic of the eugenics movement.56 As he
explained, the legislature’s conclusion that sterilization would
promote the “welfare ... of society” was not unjustified.57 After all,
upon being diagnosed a “[m]oron,” Carrie Buck was institutionalized at Virginia’s Colony for Epileptics and Feebleminded,58 the same
institution to which her mother—also judged “feebleminded”—had
been committed years earlier.59 Noting that Buck, her mother, and
52. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 6, 11-12 (1967) (striking down the Racial Integrity
Act of 1927 as an impermissible expression and endorsement of “White Supremacy”).
53. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
54. Id. at 205.
55. Id. at 203.
56. Id. at 205-06 (“[E]xperience has shown that heredity plays an important part in the
transmission of insanity, imbecility, [et cetera.]”).
57. Id. at 207.
58. Id. at 205.
59. Whether Emma Buck was actually cognitively impaired is a matter of considerable
debate. See ADAM COHEN, IMBECILES: THE SUPREME COURT, AMERICAN EUGENICS, AND THE
STERILIZATION OF CARRIE BUCK 270 (2017); PAUL A. LOMBARDO, THREE GENERATIONS, NO
IMBECILES: EUGENICS, THE SUPREME COURT, AND BUCK V. BELL x-xi (2008) (characterizing
Buck v. Bell—and the underlying diagnoses of Carrie Buck and her relatives—as “a legal
sham”). Meaningfully, her diagnosis followed the birth of two children out of wedlock and
allegations that the young widow had turned to prostitution in order to support her children,
strongly suggesting that the diagnosis and her institutionalization reflected an interest in
sexual control, as much as mental health. See Paul A. Lombardo, Three Generations, No
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her newborn daughter had all been judged intellectually disabled,60
Holmes embraced the sterilization law—and the eugenics logic that
undergirded it—as a permissible expression of the state’s police
power to legislate for the health and welfare of its citizens.61 As the
“potential parent of socially inadequate offspring, likewise afflicted,”62 Buck’s (alleged) disabilities could be easily transmitted to
her children (and to their children) in an unending lineage of
disability and deficiency.
And critically, the prospect of Buck and her progeny as dependents on the public fisc loomed large in the Court’s disposition of the
case. As Holmes noted, individuals like Carrie Buck “already
sap[ped] the strength of the State” with their indigence and dependence.63 Limiting the ability of such individuals to reproduce
(thereby limiting their opportunities to reproduce their disability,
immorality, and poverty) was a “lesser sacrifice[ ]” that would “prevent [society] being swamped with incompetence.”64 Rather than
“waiting to execute degenerate offspring for crime, or to let them
starve for their imbecility,” Holmes reasoned, “society can prevent
those who are manifestly unfit from continuing their kind.”65
Although Holmes’s opinion for the Court is infamous for its callous invocation that “[t]hree generations of imbeciles are enough,” 66
it was not laced with the explicit racism that often accompanied
eugenics-informed statutes and policies. Nevertheless, the specter
of race haunted Buck v. Bell. Recall that among the central concerns
of eugenics was cultivating the “fittest” of the species and maintaining racial purity.67 To be sure, Carrie Buck was a white woman, but
Imbeciles: New Light on Buck v. Bell, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 30, 53-55 (1985) (suggesting that
Carrie Buck was institutionalized in order to cover up—or punish her for—her sexual assault
and the resulting illegitimate birth).
60. Buck, 274 U.S. at 205 (“Carrie Buck is a feeble minded white woman who was
committed to the State Colony above mentioned in due form. She is the daughter of a feeble
minded mother in the same institution, and the mother of an illegitimate feeble minded
child.”).
61. Id. at 207 (“The principle that sustains compulsory vaccination is broad enough to
cover cutting the Fallopian tubes.” (citing Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905))).
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. See supra text accompanying notes 49-50.
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her whiteness did not insulate her from the coercive forces of the
state. Indeed, as Professor Khiara Bridges has noted, Buck’s
whiteness was likely the reason she was targeted for sterilization.68
Eugenics-inflected sterilization laws were not simply aimed at
preventing the transmission of undesirable traits, they aimed to
cultivate the best of the race—the white race.69
On this account, Carrie Buck, who was poor, under-educated, and
unchaste, was not performing whiteness in the manner prescribed
by the eugenics logic of her time.70 Given her circumstances, it was
hardly surprising that Dr. Albert Priddy, the director of the Colony
where Buck was institutionalized, categorized her as part of “the
shiftless, ignorant, and worthless class of antisocial whites of the
South”71 who posed, as much as people of color, a threat to the
purity of the white race.72
If cultivating the fittest of the race was the ultimate goal, it could
not be achieved by focusing exclusively on preventing racial heterogamy and stanching demographic change. The interest in racial
purity demanded the cultivation of the most desirable traits, while
simultaneously limiting those traits deemed deleterious and
destructive. In this regard, Buck v. Bell was not simply about
Virginia’s antipathy for the cognitively disabled, but also about its
investment in racial purity and betterment.
Fifteen years after the Court concluded that “[t]hree generations of imbeciles are enough,”73 it took up another compulsory
68. Bridges, supra note 46, at 831 (observing that it was “no accident” that Carrie Buck
“was a white woman,” as “eugenic sterilization was about white racial improvement. It was
designed to protect and perfect white racial stock. As a result, white people were those who
were in the crosshairs of pseudoscientists operating under the banner of eugenics.”); Bridges,
supra note 43, at 474 (speculating that if Carrie Buck had “not been white, she probably
would not have been sterilized. Which is to say: Her white privilege may be demonstrated by
her being an object of eugenic interest in the first instance.”).
69. Bridges, supra note 43, at 465 (“[T]he eugenics movement was always about protecting
the white race from degeneration.”); Angela P. Harris, Equality Trouble: Sameness and
Difference in Twentieth-Century Race Law, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1923, 1975 (2000) (“The new
science of eugenics seemed to place the perfection of the white race within reach if only whites
could be persuaded to adopt its principles as guides for private life and public policy.”).
70. Bridges, supra note 43, at 462-65.
71. LOMBARDO, supra note 59, at 134.
72. COHEN, supra note 59, at 58 (“Southern eugenicists were particularly concerned with
the lowest economic class, people often disparagingly referred to as ‘poor white trash,’ who
were seen as repositories of the worst of the white race’s germplasm.”).
73. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927).
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sterilization case. Skinner v. Oklahoma was a challenge to
Oklahoma’s Habitual Criminal Sterilization Act, which authorized
the sterilization of those thrice convicted of crimes of moral
turpitude.74 Like the Virginia statute upheld in Buck v. Bell, the
Oklahoma law was deeply informed by eugenics.75 However, by the
time the Supreme Court took up the challenge to the Oklahoma law,
eugenics thinking had lost some of its luster.76 As the Skinner Court
acknowledged, “[i]n evil or reckless hands,” the power to sterilize
“can cause races or types which are inimical to the dominant group
to wither and disappear.”77
Yet, despite conceding that sterilization could easily lead to
deracination, the Skinner Court did not completely disavow the
state’s authority to sterilize individuals in the name of social
welfare. Noting that it did not wish “to reexamine the scope of the
police power of the States,”78 the Court instead focused on the equality concerns that the challenged statute raised. Noting the punitive
use of sterilization, its implications for “one of the basic civil rights
of man,”79 and the fact that the Oklahoma law exempted those
convicted of “offenses arising out of the violation of the prohibitory
laws, revenue acts, embezzlement, or political offenses”80 from its
ambit, the Court struck down the statute as “a clear, pointed, unmistakable discrimination.”81
By narrowly focusing on the punitive use of sterilization and the
statute’s impermissible distinction between “blue collar” and “white
collar” crimes, the Skinner Court avoided the broader questions of
whether the Due Process Clause imposed any limit on state police
power to sterilize those with disabilities or whether Buck v. Bell was

74. 316 U.S. 535, 536 (1942).
75. VICTORIA F. NOURSE, IN RECKLESS HANDS: SKINNER V. OKLAHOMA AND THE NEAR
TRIUMPH OF AMERICAN EUGENICS 75-87 (2008) (discussing the political milieu in which the
Habitual Criminal Sterilization Act was enacted).
76. Mary Ziegler, Reinventing Eugenics: Reproductive Choice and Law Reform After World
War II, 14 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 319, 319-21 (2008) (noting scholars attribute shift in postwar eugenics rhetoric to “widespread revulsion” to Nazi sterilization policies).
77. Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 537.
81. Id. at 541.
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improperly decided.82 As a consequence, the states remained free to
maintain compulsory sterilization programs.
The Court’s announcement of its decision in Skinner roughly
coincided with the decline of the eugenics movement in the United
States. The Skinner Court’s warning about the dangers of eugenic
sterilization “[i]n evil or reckless hands”83 seemed eerily prescient
as the horrors of the Third Reich came to light in the late 1940s. In
addition to its associations with Nazism and the extermination of
religious and ethnic minority groups, the eugenics movement was
also discredited and diminished in the face of considerable skepticism and challenges from the scientific community.84 As a consequence, the rate of state-sponsored sterilizations abated in the
1950s and 1960s, and some jurisdictions repealed their sterilization
statutes.85
Nevertheless, the threat of forced sterilization persisted under a
different rationale. Rather than focusing explicitly on eugenics,
proponents of involuntary sterilization touted it as a means of
preventing excessive dependence on the state. Specifically, sterilization was lauded as a vehicle for preventing the births of children
“whose parents could not adequately care for them.”86 On this
reasoning, sterilization continued to target the disabled, though the
rationale subtly shifted away from “the nature-based genetic
rationale for eugenics” toward a “nurture-based explanation” that
centered on the privatization of dependency.87 But critically, the
82. See id. at 542 (distinguishing the Virginia statute challenged in Buck from the
Habitual Criminal Sterilization Act challenged in Skinner); see also Paul A. Lombardo,
Medicine, Eugenics, and the Supreme Court: From Coercive Sterilization to Reproductive
Freedom, 13 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 1, 24 (1996) (“Skinner qualified, but did not
overrule Buck.”); Robert L. Burgdorf, Jr. & Marcia Pearce Burgdorf, The Wicked Witch Is
Almost Dead: Buck v. Bell and the Sterilization of Handicapped Persons, 50 TEMP. L.Q. 995,
1011 (1977) (noting that Skinner “does not ... overrule” Buck); Murray, supra note 40, at 2059
(“Although Buck v. Bell has been discredited, it has never been formally overruled.”).
83. Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541.
84. PHILIP R. REILLY, THE SURGICAL SOLUTION: A HISTORY OF INVOLUNTARY STERILIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES 128 (1991); Michael G. Silver, Note, Eugenics and Compulsory
Sterilization Laws: Providing Redress for the Victims of a Shameful Era in United States
History, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 862, 870 (2004) (“Around the same time, the scientific
community began to debunk the theories behind eugenics.”).
85. REILLY, supra note 84, at 148 (noting the repeal of state eugenics statutes in the
postwar period).
86. Ikemoto, supra note 42, at 186.
87. Id.
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interest in preventing the births of those whose families were
unlikely or unable to provide adequate care also gave rise to a classoriented rendering of sterilization. Perhaps recalling Buck v. Bell’s
admonition about those who “sap the strength of the State,”88
sterilization was now viewed as a means of reducing demands on
the public fisc and public resources.
B. Race, Dependence, and the Changing Character of
State-Sponsored Sterilization
In 1973, when Roe v. Wade announced a constitutional right to
abortion,89 twenty-three states still had forced sterilization statutes
on the books.90 But critically, the populations targeted for sterilization differed dramatically from those targeted in the heyday of
eugenics. In the 1920s, Carrie Buck’s whiteness (and her failure to
comport with the norms of white middle class domesticity) made her
the focus of the state’s eugenic interest.91 During this period, communities of color were not likely to be the focus of the state’s efforts
to defend the white race from genetic debasement.92 After all,
according to eugenics logic, non-white races were already debased.93
By the same token, the realities of segregation in the early twentieth century meant that non-whites were almost always excluded
from state facilities for the cognitively disabled, where so many sterilizations were performed.94
But the landscape changed dramatically in the 1960s and 1970s.
In the 1960s, as the Civil Rights Movement brought political and
88. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927).
89. 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973).
90. Jack Slater, Sterilization: Newest Threat to the Poor, EBONY, Oct. 1973, at 154.
91. Bridges, supra note 46, at 831.
92. Id. (“For the most part, nonwhite people were not subjects of eugenic sterilization
during this time. Nonwhite people were a concern to eugenicists only to the extent that they
wanted to keep these patently inferior people, and their obviously substandard genes, away
from white people. Thus, antimiscegenation laws evidenced the only site at which eugenicists
were interested in nonwhite people. The other two points of eugenicists’ program for racial
improvement—immigration reform and coercive sterilization laws—were solely, and doggedly,
about white people.” (footnotes omitted)).
93. Id.
94. MATT WRAY, NOT QUITE WHITE: WHITE TRASH AND THE BOUNDARIES OF WHITENESS
168 n.35 (2006) (“Southern institutions had overwhelmingly white populations because blacks
were generally not considered worthy of the expense of welfare.”).
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social gains for Blacks, welfare rights groups lobbied successfully to
expand public assistance programs to include non-white women.95
Together, these developments suggested a shifting social landscape,
particularly in the South.96 As the welfare rolls swelled to include
women of color, state officials began to use welfare benefits to coerce
consent to sterilization.97 Many states, like North Carolina, used
extant sterilization statutes, which sought to sterilize those with
cognitive disabilities, to target women on public assistance.98
Reasoning that an out-of-wedlock child reflected immorality, which
in turn reflected cognitive disability, these states demanded that
unmarried mothers consent to sterilization as a condition of continued receipt of public benefits.99
North Carolina was not alone in its targeting of welfare recipients for sterilization. In the early 1970s, five states considered bills
that would explicitly coerce welfare recipients to submit to sterilization as a condition of benefits.100 For example, Tennessee considered
a bill to offer “voluntary” sterilization to welfare recipients who had
more than one child out of wedlock.101 If the mother refused to
“volunteer” for sterilization, her benefits payments would be cut off
and the State would have the right to take away any of her future
children.102 Likewise, Ohio made sterilization a prerequisite for
state aid for certain mothers.103 In other states, welfare eligibility
was accompanied by “family caps,” which imposed financial disincentives to having additional children.104 In 1970, the Supreme
95. See Gene Demby, The Mothers Who Fought to Radically Reimagine Welfare, NPR
(June 9, 2019, 9:49 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/codeswitch/2019/06/09/730684320/themothers-who-fought-to-radically-reimagine-welfare [https://perma.cc/WK2Q-RVBU].
96. Indeed, as Professor Serena Mayeri notes, sterilization programs, in tandem with laws
imposing legal impediments on illegitimacy, were widely understood as “thinly veiled attacks”
on the prospects of desegregation and expanded civil rights for Blacks. Serena Mayeri, Marital
Supremacy and the Constitution of the Nonmarital Family, 103 CALIF. L. REV. 1277, 1285
(2015).
97. Laura T. Kessler, “A Sordid Case”: Stump v. Sparkman, Judicial Immunity, and the
Other Side of Reproductive Rights, 74 MD. L. REV. 833, 893 (2015).
98. See Slater, supra note 90, at 150, 154.
99. Dorothy E. Roberts, Crime, Race, and Reproduction, 67 TUL. L. REV. 1945, 1971 (1993).
100. Evelyn Smith, End Forced Sterilization!, WONAAC, Summer 1973, at 2, 2-3.
101. Sterilization—Another Part of the Plan of Black Genocide, BLACK PANTHER, May 8,
1971, at 2.
102. Sterilize Welfare Mothers?, BLACK PANTHER, May 1, 1971, at 4.
103. Smith, supra note 100, at 3.
104. Kessler, supra note 97, at 876.
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Court, in Dandridge v. Williams, concluded that states could impose
family cap laws as a permissible condition of welfare eligibility.105
In addition to the conditioning of welfare benefits and family
caps, in 1968, the United States Department of Health, Education,
and Welfare (HEW) began financing “voluntary” sterilization of
minors.106 In 1974, on the heels of Roe v. Wade, HEW developed a
funding scheme that provided states with more generous reimbursement for sterilizations than for abortions.107 The federal program, in
tandem with the conditions on welfare benefits, offered states strong
incentives in favor of sterilizing poor women and their daughters.108
Indeed, in the early 1970s, between 100,000 and 150,000 low-income
people were sterilized annually under federally funded programs.109
Mothers who received welfare benefits were frequently pressured
to consent to sterilization while undergoing the stress of childbirth.110 Another common practice was to require “consent” to
subsequent sterilization as a condition for receiving an abortion.111
Indeed, a 1968 survey of over five-hundred teaching hospitals found
that more than half of the hospitals used sterilization as a condition
for approving an abortion request.112
To be sure, race played a significant role in coercive sterilizations.
According to a 1970 national fertility study, 20 percent of married
Black women who practiced contraception had been sterilized compared to just 8 percent of married white women who practiced
contraception.113 North Carolina administered one of the most
robust sterilization programs. During the 1960s, Black people accounted for about 25 percent of the state’s population but comprised
60 percent of those subject to state sterilization.114
105. 397 U.S. 471, 477-78 (1970).
106. Les Payne, Forced Sterilization for the Poor?, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 26, 1974, at 19.
107. Kessler, supra note 97, at 876.
108. Id. at 876-77.
109. See Relf v. Weinberger, 372 F. Supp. 1196, 1199 (D.D.C. 1974), vacated as moot, 565
F.2d 722 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (per curiam); see also Kessler, supra note 97, at 880 (discussing Relf
and the association between welfare receipt and coercive sterilization practices).
110. Gail Kennard, Sterilization Abuse, ESSENCE, Oct. 1974, at 66, 66-67; Kessler, supra
note 97, at 883.
111. See Kessler, supra note 97, at 883.
112. Smith, supra note 100, at 2.
113. Kennard, supra note 110, at 66.
114. Lutz Kaelber, Assoc. Professor Socio., Univ. Vt., Presentation at 37th Ann. Soc. Sci.
Hist. Ass’n Meeting: Histories of Capitalism (Nov. 1-4, 2012), http://www.uvm.edu/~lkaelber/
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The following Part concretizes the realities and harms of coercive
sterilization during this period. Using a little-known sterilization
case, Cox v. Stanton, as a point of entry, it provides a glimpse of the
consequences and implications of coercive sterilizations for poor
women of color.
II. COX V. STANTON IN CONTEXT
In 1964, Shelton Owens Howland, a welfare case worker, made a
routine visit to the Cox family in Plymouth, North Carolina.115
Charged by the state of North Carolina with ensuring that public
assistance benefits were properly distributed and that recipients
were conducting themselves appropriately, Howland took a particular interest in the Coxes.116 Headed by Devora, a single mother
of nine, the family was desperately poor, living in mean conditions
without access to running water, a stove, or a refrigerator.117
Howland’s particular interest in the family did not center on their
living conditions, but rather on Devora’s eldest daughter, seventeenyear-old Nial Ruth Cox, who was then unmarried and pregnant.118
Howland disapproved of Nial’s pregnancy. In the caseworker’s
view, the teenager’s pregnancy reflected both loose morals and an
inevitability that, eventually, Nial herself would be forced to apply
for public assistance, perpetuating the family’s legacy of poverty and
dependence.119 With all this in mind, Howland moved quickly to
take command of the situation. Once Nial had given birth, Howland
informed Devora and Nial that the family would lose their welfare
benefits unless Nial underwent a procedure to prevent any future
pregnancies.120 Years later, Nial recounted the experience: “They
eugenics/ [https://perma.cc/ED7E-HBJR]; see also Brenda Onyango, State Facilitated Violence
Against Black Women in North Carolina Through the Lens of Eugenic Sterilization 34 (Apr.
20, 2016) (undergraduate thesis, Duke University), https://dukespace.lib.duke.edu/dspace/
bitstream/handle/10161/11955/BrendaOnyangoFinalDraft2016Version2.pdf [https://
perma.cc/5ST4-R6YC].
115. Complaint at 3-4, 6, Cox v. Stanton, 381 F. Supp. 349 (E.D.N.C. 1974) (Civil Action No.
800).
116. Id.
117. Kessler, supra note 97, at 878.
118. Id.
119. See Complaint, supra note 115, at 7.
120. Id. at 19.
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told me that my brothers and sisters were going to be in the streets
all because of [me].”121
The withdrawal of welfare benefits was a significant threat—one
that Devora took seriously. In order to maintain the benefits for
herself and her eight minor children, Devora agreed to allow Nial to
undergo the proposed surgery.122 According to Devora, she was told
that the procedure was reversible and Nial later claimed that the
doctor reassured her both before and after the operation that she
would be able to have more children.123 These assurances, however,
were unavailing. Instead of performing a tubal ligation, which is
potentially reversible, Dr. A.M. Stanton performed a bilateral partial salpingectomy, an irreversible sterilization procedure.124
Although Stanton insisted that he explained to Nial and Devora
that the procedure would result in permanent sterilization, he
conceded that welfare officials often employed coercive tactics to
convince women to consent to sterilization—a practice Stanton
appeared to endorse.125 As he explained to a journalist, “[w]e have
a lot of mentally deficient people who should be sterilized. The
people have to pay the welfare for these children.”126
Because North Carolina’s sterilization law permitted the sterilization of cognitively impaired minors with their parents’ consent,
in documenting Nial’s procedure, Stanton described the girl as
“mentally deficient.”127 Meaningfully, Nial was not evaluated for,
nor was there any evidence of, a cognitive disability.128 Relatedly, it
121. Kim Severson, Thousands Sterilized, a State Weighs Restitution, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 9,
2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/10/us/redress-weighed-for-forced-sterilizations-innorth-carolina.html [https://perma.cc/DS79-HFWA]. Howland’s concerns were perhaps overstated. Because Nial was eighteen years old, Devora received no public assistance benefits for
Nial and her infant daughter.
122. Complaint, supra note 115, at 7.
123. Ria Tabacco Mar, The Forgotten Time Ruth Bader Ginsburg Fought Against Forced
Sterilization, WASH. POST (Sept. 19, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2020/
09/19/sterilization-ruth-bader-ginsburg/ [https://perma.cc/4H34-BM8T].
124. Complaint, supra note 115, at 8.
125. See JOHN RAILEY, RAGE TO REDEMPTION IN THE STERILIZATION AGE: A CONFRONTATION WITH AMERICAN GENOCIDE 57 (2015); Sterilization Suit Entered by Former New Bern
Woman, BURLINGTON DAILY TIMES-NEWS, July 13, 1973, at 10A, https://newscomwc.news
papers.com/image/53594450/ [https://perma.cc/8F78-F32T].
126. Sterilization Suit Entered by Former New Bern Woman, supra note 125, at 10A.
127. Complaint, supra note 115, at 9.
128. Id. at 7.
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appears that the North Carolina Eugenics Board, which administered the state’s sterilization program, never held a hearing to
determine Nial’s cognitive capacity.129 If a hearing had been conducted, neither Cox nor her mother were given notice or any kind of
opportunity to be heard or to dispute any claims of incapacity.130
Further, at no time was Devora Cox given the opportunity to contest
or dispute the prospect of Nial’s sterilization as a condition of her
continued receipt of welfare benefits.131
The situation came to a head five years later when Nial, who was
then living in New York City and working as a nurse’s assistant,
became engaged.132 Eager to start a family with her fiancé, she went
to her gynecologist to discuss reversing the earlier sterilization
procedure.133 Only then did she learn that the operation had left her
permanently infertile.134
In 1973, only a few months after the Supreme Court issued its
decision in Roe v. Wade legalizing abortion, Nial Cox filed suit
against Howland, Stanton, Washington County Hospital, and other
officials who authorized and facilitated her sterilization.135 The
lawsuit, in which she was represented by Ruth Bader Ginsburg and
Brenda Feigen Fasteau of the ACLU Women’s Rights Project,
sought damages and a declaratory judgment that North Carolina’s
forced sterilization law was unconstitutional.136 Critically, the lawsuit sought to locate coerced and forced sterilization in the landscape of reproductive rights that Roe had so recently highlighted,
while also going beyond Roe’s narrow emphasis on the unenumerated right to privacy. The complaint maintained that Nial Cox
“ha[d] been deprived of substantive and procedural due process
and equal protection of the laws, that her privacy ha[d] been invaded, that the statute is impermissibly vague and that she ha[d]
been the victim of cruel and unusual punishment.”137 Echoing one
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
2218).
136.
137.

Id. at 7-8.
Id.
See id.
Id. at 10.
Id. at 9-10.
Id. at 10.
Id. at 3-5; Brief for Appellant at 5, Cox v. Stanton, 529 F.2d 47 (4th Cir. 1975) (No. 74Complaint, supra note 115, at 1.
Id. at 2.
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of Ginsburg’s earlier lawsuits, Struck v. Secretary of Defense, which
challenged an Air Force regulation that required pregnant servicewomen to either terminate the pregnancy or leave military service,138 the Cox lawsuit pointed toward a more robust vision of
reproductive rights—one that was not limited to the decision to
avoid childbearing, but that also included the right to bear children
free from state interference and coercion.139
As importantly, the complaint emphasized that reproductive freedom, or lack thereof, was deeply informed—and indeed, exacerbated—by race, class, and status. Cox’s circumstances—from the
birth of her daughter out of wedlock to her coerced sterilization—
resulted from an interlocking system of reproductive injustices. As
the complaint averred, “[a]t the time her daughter was conceived,
[Cox] had neither knowledge of, access to nor money for birth
control devices.”140 Upon learning that she was pregnant, Cox was
obliged to continue her pregnancy, as “an abortion would have been
illegal under North Carolina law,” and would contradict her own
“personal moral and philosophical beliefs.”141 Even if Cox had no
moral qualms about terminating her pregnancy, the complaint
noted the economic circumstances that constrained her choices—
neither she nor her family had the “resources to travel to a jurisdiction where abortions were legal.”142
In this desert of reproductive choices, Nial Cox had gotten pregnant out of wedlock, and in choosing to maintain her pregnancy and
raise her daughter, she had attracted the state’s interest, making
herself a target for sterilization. Her situation was a testament to
the degree to which race, class, and gender all intersected to limit
the reproductive choices and freedom of poor women of color. As
Ginsburg and Feigen put it in the complaint, “over the years, the
Sterilization Statute has been applied discriminatorily on the basis
of sex, race, age, marital status, class or welfare status, and the ‘legitimacy’ of children of the person to be sterilized.”143 The complaint
underscored that Nial Cox was “sterilized solely or preponderantly
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

460 F.2d 1372, 1373-74 (9th Cir. 1971), vacated, 409 U.S. 1071 (1972).
See Complaint, supra note 115, at 2.
Id. at 6.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 11.
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because she is a woman, because she is black ... because she was
poor and a member of a family receiving welfare payments, and
because she was an unwed mother.”144
And while race, sex, class, and status intersected to effectively
target Nial Cox and others like her for coerced sterilization, these
intersectionalities further exacerbated the injuries related to her
sterilization. In addition to the physical ailments that Cox faced as
a result of her sterilization, societal expectations and Cox’s own
circumstances amplified the mental anguish of her sterility. In a
society where marriage and children were a norm of adult life, and
womanhood was inextricably intertwined with motherhood, Cox’s
sterilization effectively foreclosed the prospect of traditional family
life.145 Cox’s fiancé broke their engagement when he learned she was
unable to bear children,146 and as the complaint acknowledged,
“[t]he reluctance of men to marry women who are unable to bear
children makes it unlikely that plaintiff can anticipate marrying” in
the future.147 And indeed, in the absence of marriage, even alternative conduits to family formation were out of range. Eager to give
her daughter a sibling, Cox sought to adopt a two-year-old boy, “but
was discouraged from formally applying on the ground that her
unmarried status would be viewed in an unfavorable light.”148
Although the Cox v. Stanton complaint painted a searing portrait
of North Carolina’s efforts to permanently limit the reproductive
freedom of poor Black women, Ginsburg and Feigen’s efforts proved
only partly successful. A federal district court dismissed the suit as
untimely.149 Although the Fourth Circuit reversed in part, allowing
Cox to sue for damages, it also concluded that Cox lacked standing
to challenge the constitutionality of the statute because the forced
sterilization program had been effectively shuttered years earlier.150
On remand and after a brief trial on the damages issue, a jury

144. Id. at 11-12.
145. See Onyango, supra note 114, at 24.
146. Complaint, supra note 115, at 10; Tabacco Mar, supra note 123; Onyango, supra note
114, at 24 (recounting that, according to Cox, her fiancé “did not want half a woman”).
147. Complaint, supra note 115, at 10-11.
148. Id. at 11.
149. Cox v. Stanton, 381 F. Supp. 349, 352–53, 355 (E.D.N.C. 1974), aff’d and rev’d in part,
529 F.2d 47 (4th Cir. 1975).
150. Cox, 529 F.2d at 48-49.
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eventually ruled against Cox.151 In the end, Cox settled for $7,000
from Dr. Stanton in exchange for abandoning an appeal—a fraction
of the damages sought in the initial complaint.152
Nial Cox’s coerced sterilization was shocking, but it was not
anomalous. In an unrelated case, civil rights leader Fannie Lou
Hamer testified in court that, during a surgery for the removal of a
uterine tumor, she had been permanently sterilized without her
consent.153 Indeed, Hamer reported that 60 percent of Black women
admitted to Sunflower City Hospital in her Mississippi hometown
had been sterilized—prompting Hamer to colloquially tag these
sterilization procedures as “Mississippi appendectom[ies].”154 The
Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) elaborated on
Hamer’s account in a pamphlet titled “Genocide in Mississippi,”
which documented the incidence of sterilization among Mississippi’s
Black women and analyzed a proposed Mississippi law that would
make giving birth to a second or subsequent illegitimate child a
felony punishable by sterilization.155 And while SNCC focused on the
sterilization laws in Mississippi, the Mississippi legislature was not
alone in its endorsement of forced sterilization. Indeed, throughout
the 1960s and 1970s, punitive sterilization laws were proposed
throughout the country as a means of reducing the numbers of
illegitimate and poor children.156
The state interest in forced or coercive sterilization flourished in
the administration of public assistance programs. Critically, in the
1960s and 1970s, public assistance became a flashpoint of racial and
economic unrest and critique. In 1965, the Moynihan Report
condemned the “matriarchal structure” of the Black family as a key
factor in the poverty and “deteriorat[ion]” of the Black community.157
151. RAILEY, supra note 125, at 71.
152. Id.
153. JENNIFER NELSON, WOMEN OF COLOR AND THE REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS MOVEMENT 68
(2003).
154. Id.
155. STUDENT NONVIOLENT COORDINATING COMM., GENOCIDE IN MISSISSIPPI 3-4 (1964);
NELSON, supra note 153, at 68.
156. NELSON, supra note 153, at 68-69; Mayeri, supra note 96, at 1286 n.30 (documenting
the rash of sterilization bills and illegitimacy restrictions introduced in various state legislatures during this period).
157. U.S. DEP’T OF LAB. OFF. POL’Y PLAN. & RSCH., THE NEGRO FAMILY: THE CASE FOR
NATIONAL ACTION 29 (1965).
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Others argued that family structure, in tandem with dependence on
welfare and other forms of public assistance, fostered an unhealthy
cycle of poverty and dependence in minority communities.158 These
discourses informed a broader claim that low-income Black women
avoided marriage, while embracing motherhood, in order to maximize their eligibility for welfare benefits.159 As these critiques took
root—and coalesced around a narrative of poor Black women’s
hyperfecundity—sterilization again emerged as a means of controlling the unintended consequences of excessive reproduction.160
In this regard, Cox v. Stanton was one of a series of coerced
sterilization cases involving welfare recipients that received significant media attention and inspired a backlash to forced and
coercive sterilization practices.161 In Montgomery, Alabama, state
welfare officials, acting in conjunction with the federal Office of
Equal Opportunity (OEO), sterilized Minnie Lee and Mary Alice
Relf on the ground that the sisters were attracting the attention of
local boys.162 Arguing that the girls were mentally incapable of
understanding the moral and economic consequences of their budding sexuality, welfare officials demanded that the Relf parents
consent to interventions aimed at limiting their minor daughters’
reproductive capacities.163
Initially, the Relf sisters received injections of Depo-Provera, an
experimental, long-acting, reversible contraceptive.164 It was, in
effect, a temporary, though reversible, sterilization. Still, as Mr. and
Mrs. Relf later explained, they would not have consented to an
experimental treatment if they had known that Depo-Provera was

158. See ROBERTS, supra note 31, at 204–05, 207–08.
159. See id.
160. NELSON, supra note 153, at 68-69.
161. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 100, at 2-3.
162. Center Brings Suit to Ban Imposed Sterilization and Medical Experimentation on Poor
People, POVERTY L. REP., Sept. 1973, at 4 [hereinafter Center Brings Suit], https://digital.
archives.alabama.gov/digital/collection/splc/id/0/rec/4 [https://perma.cc/SB4Y-ACBP]; Slater,
supra note 90, at 150.
163. Relf v. Weinberger, S. POVERTY L. CTR., https://www.splcenter.org/seeking-justice/casedocket/relf-v-weinberger [https://perma.cc/H3TV-ZXF4].
164. Center Brings Suit, supra note 162, at 4.
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not FDA-approved for broad distribution.165 The drug was later discontinued after studies indicated it caused cancer in lab animals.166
With Depo-Provera no longer available as a contraceptive
measure, local welfare authorities determined that the Relf daughters should be permanently sterilized to avoid the prospect of future
pregnancies.167 As with the administration of Depo-Provera, the
Relfs maintained that they had no knowledge that their daughters
were to be permanently sterilized.168 According to their account,
they were told that their daughters were going to receive contraceptive injections similar to the Depo-Provera shots that they had
previously received.169 Under these conditions, when presented with
the form consenting to the sterilization, Mrs. Relf, who was illiterate, indicated her consent with an “X.”170
Minnie Lee and Mary Alice’s plight made national headlines
when the Southern Poverty Law Center filed a lawsuit on behalf of
their sister Katie, who managed to avoid sterilization by locking
herself in her bedroom when the officials from the OEO arrived to
take the Relf daughters to the hospital for the sterilization procedure.171 Meaningfully, Katie was selected to front the lawsuit
because, unlike her sisters, she was “still a member of the class of
persons subject to federally funded sterilization.”172 Critically, the
case, Relf v. Weinberger, did not challenge the underlying sterilization law, but rather, challenged the federal regulations that
165. Id. Critically, the use of Depo-Provera on the Relf sisters is consistent with reports of
widespread, experimental use of such shots on poor women and disabled women during this
time period. See, e.g., Quality of Health Care—Human Experimentation, 1973: Hearings on
S. 2071, S. 2072, and H.R. 7724 Before the S. Subcomm. on Health of the S. Comm. On Lab.
& Pub. Welfare, 93d Cong. 1444 (1973) (opening remarks of Sen. Edward Kennedy) (“Our
hearings demonstrated, to the alarm of the then FDA Commissioner Edwards, that DepoProvera was used widely in the routine practice of medicine throughout the State of
Tennessee.... As a result of these hearings, its manufacturer, Upjohn, voluntarily ceased
shipping the drug to the Arlington [S]chool [and Hospital for the Mentally Retarded] and to
the State family planning units in Tennessee. Upjohn agreed that the use of the drug in
Tennessee was inappropriate.”).
166. Center Brings Suit, supra note 162, at 4.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 1.
170. Kessler, supra note 97, at 879-80.
171. Ikemoto, supra note 42, at 179.
172. Relf v. Weinberger, 372 F. Supp. 1196, 1200 (D.D.C. 1974), vacated, 565 F.2d 722 (D.C.
Cir. 1977).

2022]

THE UNIVERSE OF REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS

1629

funded sterilization as a family planning measure.173 Thus, while
the lawsuit succeeded in establishing that the extant federal programs had failed to implement protocols to ensure that sterilizations were indeed voluntary, it did not challenge—or disrupt—the
view that sterilization could be used as a means of regulating
reproduction among the poor.174
Relf and Cox made clear the pervasive use of sterilization abuse
against poor women of color. In Aiken, South Carolina, twenty-yearold Marietta Williams, a young Black woman on public assistance,
was sterilized after giving birth to her third child.175 The operation
was performed by Dr. Clovis H. Pierce, who routinely refused to
treat welfare recipients who had three or more children unless they
agreed to be sterilized.176 Pierce also threatened expectant welfare
recipients with the termination of their benefits unless they consented to sterilization.177 “I work hard to pay my taxes,” explained
Pierce, “I’m tired of having people come to me to have babies that
will have to be supported with tax dollars.”178
Pierce’s views on welfare dependency and the need for sterilization were broadly shared.179 In the early 1970s, doctors and public health officials across the country turned to sterilization as an
effective tool in the effort to combat a wide range of perceived social
ills, from welfare dependency and poverty to overpopulation.180
Critically, however, these efforts were not limited to women in
receipt of public assistance; the scourge of coerced sterilization
173. Id. at 1198.
174. Id. at 1200.
175. More Forced Sterilization Cases Unveiled Nationwide, AFRICAN WORLD, Aug. 25, 1973,
at 14.
176. Nancy Hicks, Sterilization of Black Mother of 3 Stirs Aiken, S.C., N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 1,
1973), https://www.nytimes.com/1973/08/01/archives/sterilization-of-black-mother-of-3-stirsaiken-sc-residents-angered.html [https://perma.cc/SQ8Q-WG84].
177. Right Not to Be Sterilized, CIV. LIBERTIES, July 1974, at 8.
178. Id.
179. Maya Manian, Coerced Sterilization of Mexican-American Women: The Story of
Madrigal v. Quilligan, in REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS AND JUSTICE STORIES 97, 98–99 (Melissa
Murray et al. eds., 2019).
180. See Alexandra Minna Stern, Sterilized in the Name of Public Health: Race,
Immigration, and Reproductive Control in Modern California, 95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1128,
1129-33 (2005); Marcela Valdes, When Doctors Took ‘Family Planning’ into Their Own Hands,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 1, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/01/magazine/when-doctors-tookfamily-planning-into-their-own-hands.html [https://perma.cc/2WMC-QNSQ].
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targeted a range of women whose fertility was viewed as excessive
or likely to lead to public dependence.
In Los Angeles, for example, hundreds of working-class Latinas
were forcibly and coercively sterilized in the late 1960s and the
early 1970s.181 In 1975, ten immigrant women filed suit against the
Los Angeles County General Hospital and various physicians.182
Their complaint, which sought injunctive and monetary relief, alleged that they had been coercively and forcibly sterilized at County
General.183 Known as the Madrigal Ten, the women were Mexican
and Central American immigrants who neither read nor spoke
English.184 Although none of the women were welfare recipients
when they were sterilized,185 they maintained that they had been
targeted for sterilization because of stereotypes about immigrant
women’s hyper-fecundity and the view that poor immigrants were
inclined toward large families for which they could not provide
adequate care.186
And while cases like Cox v. Stanton and Madrigal v. Quilligan
underscored the role of state and local entities in forced or coercive
sterilization, such policies were not confined to state and municipal
actors. Through the administration of state-level public benefits
programs, HEW, the federal agency charged with administering
block grants to the states, underwrote the coercive sterilization
practices challenged in cases like Cox v. Stanton and Relf v. Weinberger. But the federal government’s involvement in forced and
coercive sterilization went even further. Under the auspices of the
Indian Health Service (IHS), the federal government oversaw the
sterilizations of significant numbers of Native American women,
often under circumstances in which informed consent was dubious.187 Indeed, the U.S. Governmental Accountability Office (GAO)
found that, between 1973 and 1976, at just four IHS regions, 3,406
Native women were sterilized in conjunction with childbirth or other
181. Stern, supra note 180, at 1134-35.
182. See Valdes, supra note 180.
183. Id.
184. Stern, supra note 180, at 1134-35.
185. Id. at 1134.
186. Id. at 1135.
187. Jane Lawrence, The Indian Health Service and the Sterilization of Native American
Women, 24 AM. INDIAN Q. 400, 404 408 (2000).
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gynecological procedures.188 Of the 3,406 sterilizations performed,
3,001 were performed on women of reproductive age.189 The impetus
for targeting Native women for family planning measures was the
high birthrate among Native women.190
The federal government’s involvement in forced and coercive
sterilizations was not limited to Indian Country. In U.S. territories
like Puerto Rico, concerns about overpopulation and poverty fueled
the interest in sterilization. Indeed, from 1937-1980, compulsory
sterilization was legal under the Puerto Rico’s territorial laws,191
and “la operación,” a government-sponsored sterilization campaign,
resulted in the sterilization of one-third of Puerto Rican women of
childbearing age.192
***
Cox v. Stanton was one of twenty-one challenges that the ACLU
brought challenging coercive and forced sterilization statutes.193
Although the ACLU did not succeed in invalidating sterilization
statutes and overruling Buck v. Bell, and no court ever reached the
merits of Cox’s constitutional claims, the lawsuit, in tandem with
suits filed on behalf of the Relf sisters and the Madrigal Ten,
prompted a public backlash against, and a critical reappraisal of,
coercive sterilization practices across the country.194

188. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, HRD-77-3, INVESTIGATION OF ALLEGATIONS
CONCERNING INDIAN HEALTH SERVICE 18 (1976).
189. Id.
190. According to the 1970 census, Native women bore 3.79 children, in stark contrast to
the 1.79 children, which was the median for all groups in the United States. Lawrence, supra
note 187, at 402.
191. HARRIET B. PRESSER, STERILIZATION AND FERTILITY DECLINE IN PUERTO RICO 6 & n.2
(1973).
192. Dorothy E. Roberts, BlackCrit Theory and the Problem of Essentialism, 53 U. MIA. L.
REV. 855, 855 (1999); see also BETSY HARTMANN, REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS AND WRONGS: THE
GLOBAL POLITICS OF POPULATION CONTROL 247-48 (1995) (discussing sterilization in Puerto
Rico).
193. Kessler, supra note 97, at 878.
194. See Smith, supra note 100, at 2-3; Tina Vasquez, ‘State of Eugenics’ Film Sheds Light
on North Carolina’s Sterilization Abuse Program, REWIRE NEWS GRP. (Jan. 30, 2017, 3:23
PM), https://rewirenewsgroup.com/article/2017/01/30/state-eugenics-sheds-light-northcarolinas-sterilization-abuse/ [https://perma.cc/TV93-EJ89].
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However, the legacy of these challenges in our understanding of
reproductive rights—and the jurisprudence related to reproductive
rights—is more muted. As I explain in the following Part, despite
these earlier legal challenges, coercive and forced sterilization has
not been a focus of the campaign to secure reproductive rights.
Instead, reproductive rights activism and agitation has centered on
broadening access to abortion and contraception. In this vein, it is
not surprising that Justice Thomas’s recent interest in the history
of reproductive control attempts to associate eugenics with the histories of abortion and contraception, rather than with the lengthy
history of eugenics-informed sterilization laws and policies. But, as
the following Part maintains, the sidelining of sterilization in reproductive rights jurisprudence comes at a cost.
III. STERILIZATION AND THE UNIVERSE OF REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS
In the Box concurrence, Justice Thomas conflates the history of
abortion with the history of birth control to make the case that
“abortion is an act rife with the potential for eugenic manipulation.”195 Although abortion and contraception have distinct histories,196 Justice Thomas’s attempt to blur these distinctions is
perhaps unsurprising. After all, abortion and birth control stand as
the twin pillars of reproductive rights, and ensuring and protecting
access to both technologies has been the singular focus of the reproductive rights movement.197
But Justice Thomas’s effort to blend the histories of abortion and
contraception—and to paint both with the brush of racial injustice—misses the mark in two important ways. First, although the
eugenics movement traded in racism, its efforts to control reproduction were aimed at optimizing the genetic composition of the

195. Box v. Planned Parenthood of Ind. & Ky., Inc., 139 S. Ct. 1780, 1787 (2019) (Thomas,
J., concurring).
196. For discussion of these distinctions, see generally Murray, supra note 40.
197. See Seema Mohapatra, Law in the Time of Zika: Disability Rights and Reproductive
Justice Collide, 84 BROOK. L. REV. 325, 339 (2019) (“The reproductive rights movement
focused primarily on the need for ‘increased access to contraception and abortion.’”); Angela
Hooton, A Broader Vision of the Reproductive Rights Movement: Fusing Mainstream and
Latina Feminism, 13 AM. U. J. GENDER, SOC. POL’Y & L. 59, 61 (2005).
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white race.198 Because the eugenics movement was preoccupied with
ensuring white purity and supremacy, its interest in non-white
communities was focused on preventing miscegenation and limiting
the entry of non-whites and less desirable whites into the country.199
To the extent the eugenics movement focused directly on controlling
reproduction, its efforts were explicitly aimed at controlling white
women’s reproduction.200 Specifically, the eugenics movement
sought to encourage middle-class white women’s reproduction by
limiting access to abortion and contraception, while simultaneously
preventing “unfit” whites—the “feeble minded,” the disabled, and
those with criminal proclivities—from reproducing through compulsory sterilization programs.201
To be sure, some might argue this clarification does not diminish
contemporary concerns that abortion may be deployed in a discriminatory fashion to eliminate marginalized groups. But this too risks
dangerously conflating two distinct concepts: the state-endorsed
eugenics programs of the early twentieth century and contemporary
women’s individual exercise of reproductive rights. Justice Thomas’s
argument blurs the distinction between these two concepts by
suggesting that constitutional recognition of reproductive rights is
consistent with the state’s endorsement of eugenics in the early
twentieth century. As he notes in the Box concurrence, “[t]his Court
threw its prestige behind the eugenics movement in its 1927
decision upholding the constitutionality of Virginia’s forced-sterilization law.”202 The unstated inference is that, in recognizing
individual rights to terminate a pregnancy and use contraception,
the Court has bestowed its imprimatur on the modern iteration of
eugenic sterilization. And in so doing, the Court has allowed reproductive rights to serve as a “disturbingly effective tool for
implementing the discriminatory preferences that undergird eugenics.”203

198. See supra Part I.
199. See supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text.
200. See supra notes 44-48 and accompanying text.
201. See supra notes 50-55 and accompanying text.
202. See Box v. Planned Parenthood of Ind. & Ky., Inc., 139 S. Ct. 1780, 1786 (2019)
(Thomas, J., concurring).
203. Id. at 1790.
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But such a position obscures the considerable difference between
the imposition of state-mandated eugenic sterilization and the
individual decision to terminate or avoid a pregnancy. As Adam
Cohen notes, there are “crucial differences” between eugenic sterilization of the sort credited in Buck v. Bell and the decision to
choose an abortion, as recognized in Roe v. Wade—and the differences lie in “who is making the decision, and why they are making
it.”204 Eugenic sterilization reflects both the state’s determination
about who may or may not reproduce, and the underlying “goal of
‘improving’ the population.”205 By contrast, in the context of abortion, “a woman decides not to reproduce, for personal reasons
related to a specific pregnancy.”206
Beyond its neglect of these crucial differences, Justice Thomas’s
effort to paint contraception and abortion as tools of racial injustice
misses the mark in its willful blindness to the very real history of
state-sponsored sterilization of marginalized groups and communities of color. Although Justice Thomas’s concurrence briefly
mentions Buck v. Bell and forced sterilization, it is only to forge a
connection between the Court’s embrace of eugenics in 1927 and its
embrace of reproductive rights in 1973.207 Otherwise, Justice
Thomas’s narrative suggests that the state’s interest in eugenics
(and compulsory sterilization programs) crested in the 1930s and
eventually abated as the pseudo-science lost favor among the
American public.208
But, as the foregoing discussion makes clear, the interest in statesponsored sterilization programs did not abate in the 1940s.209 Most
states maintained their sterilization programs during this period.210
Moreover, in the 1960s and 1970s, as the Civil Rights Movement
offered communities of color widened access to the public sphere and
204. Adam Cohen, Clarence Thomas Knows Nothing of My Work, THE ATLANTIC (May 29,
2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/05/clarence-thomas-used-my-bookargue-against-abortion/590455/ [https://perma.cc/7QYK-7WK3].
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. See Box, 139 S. Ct. at 1786 (Thomas, J., concurring).
208. See id. (“Support for eugenics waned considerably by the 1940s as Americans became
familiar with the eugenics of the Nazis and scientific literature undermined the assumptions
on which the eugenics movement was built.”).
209. See supra Part II.
210. See supra Part II.
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public benefits, state-sponsored sterilization programs were repurposed as a means of reproductive control.211
But it is not just that Justice Thomas’s narrative offers a misleading history of abortion and eugenics, while overlooking the more
recent history of racialized sterilization abuse; it is that in so doing,
Justice Thomas further marginalizes sterilization abuse in the
universe of reproductive rights concerns. On Justice Thomas’s telling, the entire universe of reproductive rights begins and ends with
abortion (principally) and contraception (secondarily). Other forms
of reproductive control are utterly absent and as such, escape
scrutiny. To be sure, the omission is not solely Justice Thomas’s
doing. Indeed, the Court’s extant reproductive rights jurisprudence,
as it is understood by both the Court and advocates, is stubbornly
oriented around abortion and contraception.212 Even where they
implicate the same privacy rights as the abortion and contraception
cases, cases involving sterilization laws are viewed as distinct from
these traditional reproductive rights concerns.213 This is likely
because, unlike abortion and contraception, which are presumed to
be individualized and elective, sterilization is often associated with
state-endorsed coercion and abuse.214 And, unlike abortion and
contraception, the abusive or coercive imposition of sterilization has,
historically, been deployed against marginalized communities.215
To fully understand the association of sterilization with marginalized communities, one need only consider the experience of
middle-class women seeking access to contraceptive sterilization.
Long after the demise of eugenics, and even as they enjoyed access
to abortion and contraception, privileged white women have struggled to access contraceptive sterilization.216 Until the 1970s, private
211. See supra Part III.
212. Sonia M. Suter, The “Repugnance” Lens of Gonzales v. Carhart and Other Theories of
Reproductive Rights: Evaluating Advanced Reproductive Technologies, 76 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1514, 1517 (2008) (“Although the Supreme Court has developed a substantial body of law
that defines reproductive rights, this jurisprudence has focused principally on decisions
regarding contraception and abortion.”).
213. See Kessler, supra note 97, at 873 (noting the acoustic separation of the Court’s
jurisprudence on eugenics and sterilization and its reproductive rights jurisprudence).
214. See Cohen, supra note 204.
215. See supra Part III.
216. See Khiara M. Bridges, Pregnancy and the Carceral State, 119 MICH. L. REV. 1187,
1199 (2021).
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hospitals often invoked the “120 rule” in dealing with their privileged white patients’ requests for contraceptive sterilization.217
Under the rule, sterilization was prohibited unless the woman’s age
multiplied by the number of children that she had equaled or exceeded 120.218 The inaccessibility of contraceptive sterilization for
affluent white women of childbearing age suggests the degree to
which their maternity was favored—indeed, compelled. By contrast,
the targeting of Black and Brown women for sterilization in the
1960s and 1970s reflects the devaluation—and indeed, active discouragement—of their maternity. In this way, despite his professed
concern about the impact of reproductive rights on marginalized
communities, Justice Thomas’s understanding of reproductive rights
is, perhaps ironically, focused on a subset of rights that are associated with—and likely to be exercised by—women vested with race
and class privilege. By contrast, sterilization abuse, and its devastating impact on minority communities, goes largely unremarked
upon in Justice Thomas’s zeal to paint abortion and contraception
with the brush of racism.
Taken together, these insights suggest the degree to which
Justice Thomas’s narrow (and misleading) focus on abortion, contraception, and eugenics exacerbates the impoverished state of
reproductive rights discourse. Not only does the Box concurrence’s
focus on abortion and contraception undersell the eugenic interest
in sterilization, in doing so, it also relinquishes an important opportunity to explore the race and class dynamics of reproductive
control and to acknowledge the implications of these dynamics for
how we value women and their reproductive capacities.
CONCLUSION
In September 2020, a consortium of advocacy groups filed a complaint with the Inspector General of the Department of Homeland
Security, condemning the treatment of Immigration and Customs
217. AM. COLL. OF OBSTETRICIANS & GYNECOLOGISTS COMM. ON ETHICS, COMMITTEE OP.
No. 695 3 (2017), https://www.acog.org/-/media/project/acog/acogorg/clinical/files/committeeopinion/articles/2017/04/sterilization-of-women-ethical-issues-and-considerations.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2E78-HFLU] (noting that white middle-class women under the care of
private physicians were particularly likely to be denied desired sterilization).
218. Id.
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Enforcement (ICE) detainees at the Irwin County Detention Center
(ICDC) in Georgia.219 According to the complaint, one of the facility’s
nurses, Dawn Wooten, had raised concerns “regarding the rate at
which hysterectomies are performed on immigrant women under
ICE custody at ICDC.”220 According to Wooten, “a lot of women [at
ICDC] go through a hysterectomy.”221 Although Wooten acknowledged that some conditions might be severe enough to warrant a
hysterectomy or tubal ligation, the sheer number of women who
were sterilized at ICDC was alarming—“everybody’s uterus cannot
be that bad.”222
And critically, it was not simply the high rates of hysterectomies
that concerned Wooten; it was also that basic protocols around
informed consent were not being followed. As Wooten explained,
“[t]hese immigrant women, I don’t think they really, totally, all the
way understand [sterilization] is what’s going to happen depending
on who explains it to them.”223
The prospect of the mass sterilization of immigrant women in
federal custody sparked outrage across the country—at least for a
moment.224 Barely a week after the story of the ICE sterilizations
broke, Justice Ginsburg passed away,225 and eight days later, Seventh Circuit Judge Barrett was nominated to take Justice Ginsburg’s place at the high court.226

219. Letter from Inst. for the Elimination of Poverty & Genocide to Joseph V. Cuffari,
Inspector General, Dep’t Homeland Sec. (Sept. 14, 2020), https://projectsouth.org/wp-content/
uploads/2020/09/OIG-ICDC-Complaint-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/5XKP-E3H3] (“Re: Lack of
Medical Care, Unsafe Work Practices, and Absence of Adequate Protection Against COVID-19
for Detained Immigrants and Employees Alike at the Irwin County Detention Center.”).
220. Id. at 2.
221. Id. at 18.
222. Id. at 19.
223. Id.
224. See, e.g., Steven Moore, ICE Is Accused of Sterilizing Detainees. That Echoes the U.S.’s
Long History of Forced Sterilization., WASH. POST (Sept. 25, 2020), https://www.washington
post.com/politics/2020/09/25/ice-is-accused-sterilizing-detainees-that-echoes-uss-long-historyforced-sterilization/ [https://perma.cc/E4J9-NCA6].
225. Nina Totenberg, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Champion of Gender Equality, Dies at
87, NPR (Sept. 18, 2020, 7:28 PM), https://www.npr.org/2020/09/18/100306972/justice-ruthbader-ginsburg-champion-of-gender-equality-dies-at-87 [https://perma.cc/JS4M-9XCX].
226. Nina Totenberg, Amy Coney Barrett: A Dream for the Right, Nightmare for the Left,
NPR (Sept. 28, 2020, 5:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/2020/09/28/917554001/amy-coney-barretta-dream-for-the-right-nightmare-for-the-left [https://perma.cc/LRU7-38SW].
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Predictably, the news cycle surrounding Barrett’s nomination focused on the likely impact of her appointment on the Court and its
jurisprudence—particularly, its abortion jurisprudence.227 Barrett,
as a conservative Catholic, it was assumed, would be skeptical of
reproductive rights and would likely cast a vote to dismantle Roe v.
Wade.228
It is perhaps ironic, though not entirely unsurprising, that one of
the most glaring episodes of coercive sterilization in recent history
should be completely overshadowed by the changed composition of
the Supreme Court and the fate of abortion rights. As this Article
makes clear, even as members of the Court have injected elements
of race into the reproductive rights debate, they have failed to locate
sterilization abuse in the discussion, focusing narrowly on more traditional reproductive rights fare—abortion and contraception. But
as the events of September 2020 make clear, sterilization abuse, as
much as abortion rights, is part of the landscape of reproductive
control that exists to this day in the United States. The failure to
acknowledge and grapple with this reality disserves the concept of
reproductive rights and the many women whose lives are irrevocably shaped by the state’s efforts to regulate reproduction.

227. See id.
228. See id.

